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Rivero v. Rivero, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 84 (Oct. 30, 2008) *
FAMILY LAW—CHILD CUSTODY
Summary
Appeal from a district court post-divorce decree order modifying a joint child custody
award.
Disposition/Outcome
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court reversed and remanded the
district court’s determinations that the parties had joint physical custody and Ms. Rivero was not
entitled to child support. The court affirmed the Judge Miley’s refusal to recuse, the district
court’s denial of Ms. Rivero’s motion to disqualify Judge Miley, and the district court’s award of
Mr. Rivero’s attorney’s fees.

Factual and Procedural History
Appellant Michelle Rivero had divorced respondent Elvis Rivero. Their divorce decree
granted “joint physical custody” for their minor child and no child support obligations for either
party. Ms. Rivero had custody five days a week and Mr. Rivero had custody two days a week.
Approximately one year after district court entered the divorce decree, Ms. Rivero moved to
modify child custody and support, alleging that Mr. Rivero did not spend time with the child and
that she had de facto primary custody.
In response to Ms. Rivero’s motion, the district court heard arguments from the parties’
counsel and testimony from the parties. Although the parties presented conflicting testimony,
the district court did not require an evidentiary hearing. The district court concluded that the
divorce decree did not reflect the actual time share agreement. The court denied Ms. Rivero’s
motion for child support, found that the parties had joint physical custody, and ordered family
mediation to establish a timeshare plan, the decree’s only remaining issue.
Following the hearing, Ms. Rivero argued that the court should reopen and allow
discovery for the child support issue. The court refused. In response, Ms. Rivero requested that
Judge Miley, the presiding judge, recuse herself. Judge Miley refused and Ms. Rivero moved to
disqualify Judge Miley. Mr. Rivero opposed the motion and moved for attorneys fees.
Chief Judge Hardcastle considered Ms. Rivero’s motion and an affidavit provided by
Judge Miley. Chief Judge Hardcastle found Ms. Rivero’s claim to be without merit. As a result,
the court denied Ms. Rivero’s motion without a hearing or a reply.
At a later hearing, the district court addressed the issues of attorney’s fees and the
custody timeshare arrangement. The court granted fees to Mr. Rivero for defending a frivolous
motion. The court also denied Ms. Rivero’s request for an evidentiary hearing because the
hearing would produce only self-serving testimony and it was unnecessary since the court was
not changing the custody award, but only modifying joint physical custody. Furthermore,
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because the parties failed to reach an agreement in mediation, the court determined that the
parties actually intended an equal timeshare and, while joint physical custody does not require an
equal split, the current five-day, two-day split was too unequal to comprise joint physical
custody. As a result, the district court ordered an equal timeshare.
Ms. Rivero appealed the district court’s order denying her motion for child support, the
order denying her motion to disqualify Judge Miley, and the order awarding Mr. Rivero’s
attorney’s fees and modifying the custody timeshare arrangement.
Discussion
Joint Physical Custody
The court noted that district courts, the bar, and litigants needed a precise definition of joint
physical custody to make informed custody decisions. In response, the court chose to adopt the
Missouri definition of joint physical custody as recommended in an amicus curiae brief
submitted by the Family Law Section. 1 While Nevada did not have any statutory or case law
expressly defining the term joint physical custody, previous Nevada case law implied that joint
physical custody did not require an equal timeshare. 2 Similarly, the Missouri definition does not
require an equal timeshare. It emphasizes “significant, but not necessarily equal” timeshare,
providing the courts and the parties flexibility. This definition also helps the courts to clarify
what the parties mean when they use the term “joint physical custody” because it requires the
courts to consider whether the parents’ time with the child is significant, frequent, continuous
and meaningful.
Custody Modification
The court reviewed the district court’s custody decision for an abuse of discretion and
questions of law de novo. Although the courts have broad discretion in child custody matters,
the court’s factual findings must be supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is
evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment.
The court stressed the importance of a district court’s findings of fact in child custody
determinations. A district court’s sole concern in child custody matters is the best interest of the
child, but the test for modifying a custody arrangement differs depending on whether a party is
seeking to modify joint physical custody or primary physical custody. Consequently, the
determination of whether the parties had joint physical custody dictates the appropriate test for
modification.
The court noted that, in this case, the district court failed to provide any findings of fact to
support its determination that the Riveros’ custody arrangement was actually joint physical
custody. The district court relied solely on its conclusion that the parties shared custody on an
equal time basis. Additionally, the district court modified the timeshare arrangement without
providing specific findings of fact that the modification was in the child’s best interest. Thus, the
1

“’Joint physical custody’ means an order awarding each of the parents significant, but not necessarily equal,
periods of time during which a child resides with or is under the care and supervision of each of the parents. Joint
physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure the child of frequent, continuing and
meaningful contact with both parents.” Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.375(1)(3) (West 2003).
2
Barbagallo v. Barbagallo, 105 Nev. 546, 548, 779 P.2d 532, 534 (1989).

court held that the district court abused its discretion by ruling that the custodial arrangement
was joint physical custody and that an equal time share was in the child’s best interest because it
failed to provide specific findings of fact that were supported by substantial evidence.
According to the court, the district court must first consider the true nature of the custody
arrangement under the newly adopted Missouri definition and make specific findings of facts.
Then, the district court may apply the appropriate test for custody modification.
Child Support
The court found that the district court abused its discretion by denying Ms. Rivero’s motion
for child support. Under NRS Chapter 125B, a custodial parent may be entitled to child support
despite contrary terms of the divorce decree.3 Here, the court held that the district court should
have determined whether Ms. Rivero was entitled to child support under NRS Chapter 125B. If
the district court then decided to depart from the amount of child support provided by the
appropriate formula, it must provide what the child support would have been under the formula
and specific findings of fact to support its decision.
In reviewing the issue of child support, the court noted that Nevada had yet to establish a
formula to determine child support in situations where the parties has joint physical custody and
unequal timeshare. In cases of primary physical custody and unequal timeshare, a court applies a
statutory formula, along with any necessary deviations. 4 In cases of joint physical custody and
equal timeshare, a court calculates child support according to the Wright formula. 5 Here, the
court expanded on the Wright formula by modifying the formula to account for differences in
both income and timeshare between the parents. 6 The court noted that this modified formula
furthered the child’s best interest by equalizing the parents’ standard of living and thus courts
should be cautious about reducing the amounts of child custody.
Motion for Recusal and Motion for Disqualification
The court reviewed the Judge Miley’s decision not to recuse herself for abuse of discretion.
The court pointed out that the burden of proof required to disqualify a judge rests with the
moving party, and Ms. Rivero failed to support her allegation of Judge Miley’s bias with
evidence in the record. The court found that neither Judge Miley nor Chief Judge Hardcastle
3

See Atkins v. Atkins, 50 Nev. 333, 336-37, 259 P. 288, 288-89 (1927).
Nev. Rev. Stat. 125B.070; Nev. Rev. Stat. 125B.080.
5
Wright v. Osburn, 114 Nev. 1367, 1368-69, 970 P.2d 1071, 1072 (1998). Under the Wright formula, the court first
takes the difference between the child support payments required from each parent pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat.
125B.070(1)(b). The court may then apply various statutory factors under Nev. Rev. Stat. 125B.080(9) to adjust this
difference. The higher-income parent is required to pay the resulting amount to the lower income parent.
6
The seven steps of the newly adopted modified Wright formula are as follows:
1. Apply the original Wright formula.
2. Determine the percentage of time each parent spends with the child.
3. Determine the differences between the amounts of time in Step 2.
4. Multiply each parent’s calculated child support by the time difference.
5. Subtract this adjusted child support amount from the parent who has the child most of the time and add the
adjusted child support amount to the parent who has the child less of the time.
6. Subtract the smaller number from the larger, and the parent that owes the greater amount pays this
difference to the other parent.
7. Apply any applicable statutory caps.
4

abused their discretion by refusing to recuse and denying Ms. Rivero’s motion to disqualify
without allowing Ms. Rivero a hearing or a reply on the issue.
In addition, the court also reviewed the district court’s decision to grant Mr. Rivero’s
attorneys fees for defending Ms. Rivero’s motion to disqualify for an abuse of discretion. Ms.
Rivero argued that the attorney’s fees sanction for her motion to disqualify is prohibited by Nev.
Rev. Stat. 1.230. The court disagreed and found that attorney’s fees were granted appropriately.
The court reasoned that, although Nev. Rev. Stat. 1.230 prohibits punishment for contempt,
attorney’s fees sanctions are not similar enough to contempt to bar these sanctions on parties
who bring frivolous motions to disqualify a judge. 7 Punishment for contempt either preserves
the rights of a party or preserves the authority of the court. In contrast, attorney’s fees sanctions
promote efficient administration of justice and compensate a party who must pay to defend a
frivolous motion. Here, the attorney’s fees compensated Mr. Rivero for fees spent defending
Ms. Rivero’s frivolous motion to disqualify Judge Miley. Thus, the district court acted within its
discretion because the fees were not punishment for contempt prohibited by Nev. Rev. Stat.
1.230.
Conclusion
Nevada has adopted the Missouri definition of joint physical custody. This definition
requires the courts to consider whether the parents’ time with the child is significant, frequent,
continuous and meaningful, without requiring an equal timeshare. By clarifying what the term
joint physical custody means, this explicit definition will allow parties to make informed custody
decisions.
Also, Nevada courts will now apply the modified Wright formula to determine the amount of
child support in cases of joint physical custody and unequal timeshare. This formula accounts
for differences in both the custodial parents’ incomes and the amount of time each parent spends
with the child. By equalizing the parents’ standard of living, this formula seeks to promote the
best interest of the child.
Finally, an attorney’s fees sanction is not punishment for contempt under Nev. Rev. Stat.
1.230. Punishment for contempt seeks to preserve the rights of a party or preserve the authority
of the court. An attorney’s fee sanction, on the other hand, merely compensates a party for the
cost of defending against frivolous motions.

7

Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.010(2)(b), Nev. R. Civ. P. 11, and EDCR 7.60(b) allow the district court to award attorney’s fees
as a sanction on parties that bring a frivolous claim.

